Psychologists of my generation will recognize the implicit reference in my title immediately: to Kurt Lewin's classic paper that introduced most of us to the excitement of his ideas when we read it as the initial chapter of A Dynamic Theory of Personality . When Lewin wrote about "The Conflict Between Aristotelian and Galilean Modes of Thought in Contemporary Psychology" over a half a century ago, it was indeed a breath of fresh air. Along with a very few other books (...) and papers, it stands out saliently in my memory as having had a large part in forming my enduring perspective in psychology. It surely played a similar role for many others, by no means just Lewinians. We cannot readily recall its content since we've absorbed it, and built it into the fabric of our thought. I turn back to Lewin's essay because it represents the psysicalist tradition in psychological theory at its best, free of many faults that tainted the behavioristic expressions of positivism. All the same, the hermeneutic and contextualist critique of positivism should leave us dissatisfied with Lewin's version of a Galilean strategy for psychology. In one respect, thus, I am using this occasion for my own "me-too" endorsement of post-positivist theorizing. My second concern here is to focus attention on the need for a culturally and historically contextualized approach in personality theory. Finally, this occasion lets me talk some sense about post-positivist perspectives in psychology. As usual, the conceptual innovators have not been very reasonable. If a contextualized psychology of persons is to be advanced, we need a more plausible version of contextualism than is being argued by the leading polemicists. This is also an effort, therefore, to domesticate a contextualized approach, to accommodate it to its prospective role of defining a new mainstream of theorizing at the softer, more human end of the psychological spectrum. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

IN A PREVIOUS study entitled, "Time, Times and the 'Right Time': Chronos and Kairos," I explored the distinction between these two aspects of time and their relations to each other. I wish to return to the topic in this paper, building on my previous discussion but bringing in some new dimensions that were unknown to me earlier on. I did not know, for example, that kairos, although it has metaphysical, historical, ethical and esthetic applications, is a concept whose original home, (...) so to speak, was in the ancient rhetorical traditions. A recent study is aimed at recovering this important idea in the present situation. It is not insignificant that, while kairos has important philosophical implications, students of rhetoric have not been alone in neglecting it as can be seen from the fact that it is not listed in the four volume Dictionary of the History of Ideas, edited by Philip Wiener, nor is it to be found in The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon, edited by Mortimer Adler. One reason for the omission is no doubt the absence of any cognate word in English for kairos whereas its partner, chronos, appears in a host of forms throughout any English dictionary. The only exception that occurs to me is the quite rare word 'Kairotic' which is listed only in the most complete dictionaries. The loss of the concept of kairos is doubly unfortunate for, on the one hand, the idea has been of enormous significance in the past figuring essentially, for instance, in the religious traditions of the West, and, on the other hand, it expresses a most important feature of temporal process which, despite exceptions here and there, is not expressed in the concept of chronos. It is with these facts in mind that I am attempting to rehabilitate, as it were, the kairos aspect of time and to show its philosophical importance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Libanius the Sophist: Rhetoric, Reality, and Religion in the Fourth Century by Raffaella CribioreRobert J. PenellaRaffaella Cribiore. Libanius the Sophist: Rhetoric, Reality, and Religion in the Fourth Century. Townsend Lectures/Cornell University Studies in Classical Philology. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013. x + 260 pp. Cloth, $49.95.Raffaella Cribiore has earned her Libanian stripes, especially with her The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch (Princeton 2007). When she (...) was invited to give the Townsend Lectures at Cornell University, of which the book under review is the published version, she decided to use that occasion as an opportunity to settle some Libanian misunderstandings, to insist on certain methodological principles, and to offer solutions to some specific problems. The book touches on a good number of discrete points; it might be described as a Libanian mélange. But, as its title indicates, the agenda revolves around matters of rhetoric and religion.In chapter 1, “Rhetoric and the Distortion of Reality,” the central exhibit is Oration 1, Libanius’ so-called autobiography. Cribiore provides a good discussion of its compositional history—the main section (1–155) written in 374 when Libanius was sixty years old and the rest at various sittings from 380 to 393—and of the main lines of its narrative. Any autobiography is, of course, an interpretive construction, a “distortion of reality,” made at a certain point or points in one’s lifetime. Cribiore explores Libanius’ self-interpretations, most famously the [End Page 537] role he allots to Tychē in his life. She shows how Libanius’ letters, written with immediacy at a particular point in time, can sometimes act as a factual corrective to the autobiography. Cribiore wonders whether one source of Libanius’ self-shaping may have been the holy-man tradition. She is struck by commonalities in Libanius’ autobiography and biographies of Apollonius of Tyana, Pythagoras, and Plotinus, although she does not believe that the Philostratean and Neopla-tonic works in question directly inspired Libanius. On the other hand, she argues that he read Athanasius’ life of the Christian monk Antony, in which he “could find much that could help him shape the narrative of his own life” (74). While I would not deny that Libanius might have read this work, I am not convinced that we need to invoke it to explain similarities of motif (or of counter-motif) found in his autobiography. All the commonalities are better seen, in Mortimer Smith’s words, as arising “from the general religious and intellectual milieu” (63).Chapter 2, “A Rhetor and His Audience: The Role of Invective,” depicts Libanius as a master of the emotions—provoking pity, anger, and shame, and also consoling grief—and of invective and satire. Personal invective had deep roots in the classical past; and classical models of invective, especially Demosthenes and Aeschines, were still inspiring emulation in Libanius’ day. Libanius could control the size of his listening or reading audience and suppress proper names or resort to allusion in attacking contemporary figures in his orations, but Cribiore rejects Paul Petit’s view that Libanius kept his most abusive orations “hidden in his file drawers,” intended “only for himself or for an audience of two or three friends” (86–87). They were far more publicly intended than that. The publicity of invective, though, raises a problem: the same Libanius who condemns certain public figures in the orations is very polite to them in the letters. (Cribiore is particularly interested in the case of Proclus, comes Orientis in 383–84.) Does this not make Libanius a hypocrite who can turn easily from invective to flattery? Cribiore tries to mitigate bald inconsistency by observing that traditional invective would have been taken cum grano salis, whereas a friendly and restrained tone would have been expected in letters. Fair enough. But such an observation, based on conventions of genre and the expectations of the audiences, tells us very little about the writer’s actual state of mind and behavior in any particular case. Cribiore’s insistence here on the publicity (more or less) of orations is one side of a coin that first appears in chapter 1, although it is not put to much... (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 35, Issue 1, pp 75 - 94 Grotius always claimed that De veritate was not a controversial work, but it was not as innocuous nor as straightforward as Grotius would have his reader believe. It was the theological counterpart to his groundbreaking De iure belli ac pacis and it offered a distinctive version of Christianity which could complement his system of natural and international law. Both works were built upon a particular conception of human nature and natural (...) law, one which was not shared by many of Grotius’ contemporaries. In De veritate, Grotius emphasised that human beings could and should embrace Christianity voluntarily, in response to the revelation they found in the Scriptures. In this way, Grotius provided a way of understanding Christianity which did not appeal to any innate notion of God, and which removed the Christian religion from the sphere of nature and from the shared civic life which was built upon natural foundations. His aim was to shield civic life from the potentially destabilising effects of religious controversy and to promote Christian morality, but his ethical reading of Christianity brought with it important political and theological consequences. This article will show both the novelty, and the instability, of Grotius’ conception of Christianity. (shrink)

el derecho, la razón y la emoción tienen una larga, estrecha y complicada relación en la historia de la filosofía y de la justicia. Esta discusión sugiere que el derecho gana legitimidad y eficacia cuando une la razón con la emoción, que la razón y la emoción humana son los valores rectores de cualquier sistema jurídico justo, que todos los sistemas jurídicos dicen ser justos y que todos los sistemas jurídicos y todos los académicos del derecho hacen uso de estas (...) ideas, ya sea que las reconozcan o no. Este artículo busca aclarar los conceptos “derecho”, “razón”, “emoción”, “justicia”, “eficacia” y “Estado de derecho”, con el fin de comprender mejor cómo se relacionan entre ellos y así establecer la agenda para un mayor diálogo entre los mismos. Para lo anterior, el primer paso sería considerar cómo estas palabras han sido y deberían usarse para una mejor comprensión y un eventual mejoramiento del derecho y la sociedad. Razón y emoción son los pilares gemelos del derecho, que hacen que este último sea legítimo, justo y eficaz cuando se toman debidamente en cuenta. Nadie puede entender correctamente el derecho sin hacer referencia tanto a la emoción humana como al propósito con el que el derecho existe para servir, que es el bienestar racional de todos y cada uno de los miembros de la sociedad. (shrink)

Though the philosopher will undoubtedly find this study too elementary for many of his purposes, the student of literature and the generally interested reader will be delighted by this rich source of reference material. Published under the general editorship of Mortimer J. Adler by the Institute for Philosophical Research, The Idea of Love has one of the most accessible formats of the Concepts in Western Thought Series. Preliminary chapters explain critical notions used in later schematizations of various figures, and (...) relate in neat topical divisions controversies about natural and supernatural human love. Next, illustrative chapters present different authors according to whether they hold that love can be either acquisitive or benevolent desire, is only acquisitive desire, must include benevolence, is wholly or primarily judgment. Two final divisions which overlap these give judgmental aspects of wholly and primarily tendential conceptions of love. Expositions within each of these divisions both justify the classification and adequately develop particular sub-themes. In toto, more than forty philosophers, writers, theologians, and psychologists receive a fairly extensive treatment, including generous citations, while brief references are also made to minor figures. Among those given major consideration are Plato, Augustine, Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Dante, Kierkegaard, Kant, Freud, Jung, and William James ; Plotinus, Andreas Capellanus, Stendhal, Schopenhauer, Santayana, Darwin, Rousseau, Spinoza, Leibniz ; Adam Smith, Hegel, C. S. Lewis, Ortega Y Gasset, Erich Fromm ; Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Pascal. The work is indexed and supplemented by a seven-page bibliography.--C. M. R. (shrink)

Aristotle taught logic to Alexander the Great and, through his enduring philosophical works, to Mortimer Adler as well. The one went on to conquer the world; the other to dominate the field of adult education in the United States. Now Adler instructs the world in the "uncommon common sense" of Aristotelian logic.

Hobbes was an unusual Christian, and one that recognized the potential power of the Christian story to strengthen commonwealths. This chapter discusses the account of Christianity found in Leviathan, which was designed to replace contemporary versions with one that would promote stability and obedience within the state. Hobbes’s religious ideas, like his political philosophy, began from his understanding of human beings; he insisted that religious belief was natural to humans, stemmed from anxiety, and needed to be coordinated by a sovereign (...) to prevent strife. For Hobbes, Christianity was a particularly effective remedy for such anxiety, at least when interpreted along correct lines. The theology developed by Hobbes was original, but it probably drew on ideas circulating among his Anglican acquaintances; indeed in Leviathan we see these ideas being used for a very different purpose. As Hobbes’s acquaintances realized, at the center of Hobbes’s project in Leviathan lay an extremely heterodox theology which could enhance the state while destroying the independent authority of the Church. (shrink)

Preeminent psychoanalyst Mortimer Ostow believes that early childhood emotional attachments form the cognitive underpinnings of spiritual experience and religious motivation. His hypothesis, which is verifiable, relies on psychological and neurobiological evidence but is respectful of the human need for spiritual value. Ostow begins by classifying the three parts of the spiritual experience: awe, Spirituality proper, and mysticism. After he pinpoints the psychological origins of these feelings in infancy, he discusses the foundations of religious sentiment and practice and the brain (...) processes associated with spiritual experience. He then focuses on spirituality's relationship to mood regulation, and the role of negative spirituality in fostering religious fundamentalism and demonic possession. Ostow concludes with an analysis of an essay by the psychoanalyst Donald M. Marcus, who recounts his own spiritual experience during a Native American-style "vision quest" in the woods. Marcus's account demonstrates the constructive potential of spirituality and the way in which spirituality retrieves and recapitulates feelings of attachment to the mother. Persuasively and brilliantly argued, _Spirit, Mind, and Brain_ brings the disciplines of religion, behavorial neuroscience, and philosophy to bear on a groundbreaking new method for understanding religious ritual and belief. (shrink)

For the purposes of this paper, realism is defined as the belief that in visual perception there is a direct perception of material bodies existing in space external to the perceiver's body. Most contemporary positivists and analytical philosophers are realists in this sense. Included in this classification would be all those who argue from the character of seen relations of bodies to the uniformity view of causation; those who oppose public to private experience; those who believe that one can point (...) to facts; those who believe in the real existence of objects like extended solid tables and chairs; and those who distinguish in terms of verifiability between judgments of color and judgments of value. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE Plato IT is a mark of wisdom in Greek political thought that the form and content of education receive primary consideration from those who are ...

Preface by Dr. Franz Alexander - Director, Psychiatric and Pychosomatic Research Institute Mount Sinai Hospital, Los Angeles. Vol. 9.

IX INTRODUCTION It is no exaggeration to say that in many scientific centers not the interest in certain fundamental problems but the fortuitous possession of ...